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THE MARGINAL COST OF AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES 
 
Abstract 
We provide a new approach for assessing the cost of marginal ecosystem changes and the effectiveness of agri-environmental 
schemes. The approach is based on a theoretical and empirical analysis of the bio-economic production interactions between 
marketed outputs and non-marketed ecosystem services at the micro level. To frame the economic nature of the problem, we 
employ a generalized joint production model in combination with cost minimization. The generalized joint production framework 
allows for the consideration of complementary, substitutive and competitive relationships between agricultural production and 
non-marketed ecosystem services generation and avoids double counting. From this theoretical model we distinguish three 
theoretical cases depending on the imposed minimum acceptable level of the non-marketed ecosystem services. We employ farm 
level panel data for the UK to empirically investigate these cases. More specifically, to represent and evaluate the production 
structure, we estimate first- and second-order elasticities derived from a flexible transformation function. Results show that the 
majority of farms produce agricultural output and ecosystem services in a complementary relationship. Generation of multiple 
ecosystem services on the same farm showed either a substitutive or competitive relationship. A change in the composition of the 
ecosystem services output would have very different implications for individual farms.  
Keywords: agri-environmental services, bio-economic modelling; economies of scale and scope 
JEL codes: Q18, Q57, Q58. 
 
1.     Introduction 
Farmland plays a critical role in the provision of many ecosystem services (ES) in addition to providing 
traditional consumptive benefits (food, fiber and fuel). The list of ES that agriculture envelopes has grow 
to include such things as carbon sequestration, energy conservation, wildlife habitats of various kinds, 
scenic views and cultural heritage, along with water and air quality. Whereas the ES per unit area might be 
lower than that of unmanaged ecosystems such as wetlands and forests, the fact that some 40 % of the 
Earth land area is used for farming purposes emphasises the potential total contribution (Foley et al., 
2005). In recognition of the value associated with the non-marketed ES services, agri-environmental 
agreements  are  receiving  increasing  attention  as  a  means  to  enhancing  (reducing)  the  supply  of 
environmental public goods (bads) associated with agricultural activities. Such schemes offer “green” 
payments (incentive payments and /or cost share) or to encourage agricultural producers to voluntarily 
adopt farming methods that enhance (reduce) the supply of environmental public goods (bads). However 
there  is  an  increasing  debate  as  to  whether  programs  as  currently  implemented  actually  deliver  the 
expected  outcomes  (e.g.,  Kleijn  and  Sutherland,  2003;  2006;  Pullin  and  Knight,  2009;  Hodge  and 
Reader, 2010).  
We see three main challenges:  how to make the concept of non-marketed ES operational, how to take into 
account that many non-marketed ES are produced jointly or simultaneously with agricultural goods, and 
how to derive detailed supply (marginal cost) functions for the non-marketed ES across a heterogeneous 
landscape. In the recent literature most attention has been focussed, and progress made, with the first issue. 
For example, Boyd and Banzhaf (2007) and Fisher et al. (2009) define and classify ecosystem services in 
a way useful for environmental decision making and policy. In addition, both theoretical and normative 
studies have investigated the second issue of the interrelation of ES and agricultural commodities (Havlík 
et al., 2005; Wossink and Swinton, 2007). Absent however are studies for the third issue, that is empirical 
work on the supply and opportunity costs of ES associated with agro-ecosystems (except for Peerlings and 
Polman, 2005). The dearth of marginal cost and supply studies is in sharp contrast in particular to the 
growing literature on the societal relevance and valuation of these same ES (e.g., Porter et al., 2009). 
Although knowledge of how ES affect human wellbeing is important, understanding and modelling the 
underlying processes leading to service provision is essential for predicting and managing change in ES 
(Nicholson et al., 2009). 
The provision of ES in agricultural ecosystems depends on both the biophysical heterogeneity across the 
landscape and on farm management but how these factors interact to affect ES output and composition is 
still poorly understood. The general understanding is that a further integration of ecological and social 
sciences research into policy relevant decision modelling would allow ‘better’ choices to be made. Here 
‘better’  means  cost-efficient,  so  targets set by public  demand  are  met  at  minimum cost — efficient 
environmental management maximises the benefits gained for the money spend given a limited budget 
(Rashford and Adams, 2007; Fisher et al., 2008).  
Against this background the overall research question of our paper is as a follows: How to determine the 
cost of marginal ecosystem changes and the effectiveness of green payments based on a theoretical and  
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empirical analysis of the bio-economic production relationships at the micro (farm) level. Identification of 
ES supply functions of agro-ecosystems depends on the knowledge of the relationships between marketed 
and  non-marketed  ES,  and  assessment  of  direct  cost  and  opportunity  costs  at  the  margin.  These 
opportunity costs vary by the green things considered and across farms, reflecting local and farm–specific 
conditions.  Thus  supply  curves  should  be  estimated  at  a  low  level  of  aggregation  accounting  for 
biophysical and socio-economic variability.  
Our paper contributes to the literature as follows. First, the approach in our paper is based on several non-
marketed ecosystem services simultaneously and in conjunction with agricultural production. To gain 
insights into the nature of the problem, we employ a generalized joint production model in combination 
with  cost  minimization.  The  generalised  joint  production  framework  allows  for  the  consideration  of 
complementary, substitutive and competitive relationships between marketed and non-marketed benefits 
generated  by  agro-ecosystem  services.  We  implement  the  generalised  joint  production  framework 
empirically as a transformation function. To the best of our knowledge, no similar empirical study in the 
context of agricultural ES has been reported in the economics literature. Our paper is also different from 
Omer et al. (1997) who address whether technology change over time has contributed to ES from agro-
ecoystems.  
Second, we include farm/farmer specific impacts and use panel data analysis. Armsworth et al. (2009) 
emphasise how panel data analysis in particular could serve as an analytical bridge between ecology and 
the social sciences. Whereas this statistical method is common in applied micro economics and also in 
other areas (such as evidence based medicine) it has not been taken up by ecologists. Panel data modelling 
offers a solution to the problem of bias caused by unobserved heterogeneity, a common problem in the 
fitting of models with  cross-sectional data  sets  from non experimental  settings. This  means that our 
approach differs from standard work on the evaluation of conservation practices. Ecological studies that 
address  farmland  ES  commonly  use  controlled  experiments  and  parsimonious  models.  The  focus  is 
typically on the response to one conservation activity under specific environmental conditions and much 
of this experimental work has been undertaken to investigate the response of biodiversity to changes in 
land use activity. Because of resource and design constraints, ecological field programs can only cover a 
limited amount of environmental variation. Meta-analysis of the results of several of such experiments has 
been suggested but such methods are still premature in practice (Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006; but see 
Kleijn  et  al.,  2009).  In  addition  and  importantly,  ecological  experiments  typically  address  only  the 
ecological effects and do not look at the opportunity costs of the conservation activity. 
Third, as an empirical example we apply our approach to farm level panel data for the U.K., a country 
where an ecosystem approach to land use is being widely discussed and promoted by governmental and 
non-governmental  agencies  (Sutherland  et  al.,  2006).  We  consider  the  Environmental  Stewardship 
Scheme (ESS) and the Hill Farm Allowance (HFA). Main objective of both ESS and HFA is to secure ES 
benefits  at  levels  above  those  of  the  minimum  acceptable  cross-compliance  conditions  applying  for 
income-support payments through the Single Payment Scheme under the EU’s Common Agricultural 
Policy
1.  The  ESS  seeks  to  bring  a  large  proportion  of  farmland  across  the  country  under  agri-
environmental agreements by offering a wide range of management options from which farmers ‘earn’ 
points towards a minimum per farm (based on size). In contrast the HFA is spatially targeted and has a 
fixed set of management regimes.  
The results of the random effects estimation of the flexible transformation function reveal that the majority 
of  farms  in  our  sample  produce  agricultural  output  and  ecosystem  services  in  a  complementary 
relationship. The combined generation of different ecosystem services on the same farm show either a 
substitutive or competitive relationship. We also find that a change in the composition of the ecosystem 
services output would have very different implications for individual farms. This corresponds well with 
the concerns and debate about the proposed reformulation of the HFA program as an ESS program for the 
Uplands in the UK.   
We proceed as follows. The next two sections introduce the theory and hypotheses followed by the 
empirical method and the data, after which we report the results of the statistical analysis and discuss our 
findings. In the conclusion, we elaborate on the implications of our findings for policy analysis and for 




2.       Ecosystem Services and Agriculture  
We limit our analysis to the role of ES in agro-ecological systems. Specifically we look at the role of these 
ES in the decision context of agri-environmental schemes. In line with Boyd and Banzhaf (2007), we treat 
ES as ecological phenomena. An important distinction is that services and benefits are not identical — 
services only generate benefits in a situation of demand. Thus ES are the aspects of agro-ecological 
systems utilised (actively or passively) to produce human well-being. These services do not have to be 
directly utilised. We agree with Fisher et al., (2009) that delineating between intermediate services, final 
services and benefits might be the best we can. It is unlikely we will have the capacity or knowledge to 
measure of all the interactions and dependencies between ecosystem components and processes.  
Farm practices vary widely in the level of public and private externalities they generate. Although properly 
managed lands can have beneficial effects on ecosystem functioning, many studies have documented the 
substantial negatives impacts of agriculture on various ecosystem services. Thus the combination in which 
ES and marketable outputs are generated is not fixed but depends on the specific farm practices used. 
Figure A1 in the appendix shows to two sets of practices (production possibility frontiers) in profit and ES 
space. When visualised as a production possibility frontier the ES-dimension of agricultural production 
exist both in the negative and the positive quadrant (Chouinard et al., 2008). Whether a certain profit is 
obtained with positive or negative public ES is an empirical question depending on farming practices 
available and local conditions.  
In  agro-ecosystems some final  ES  are produced  with marketed  outputs as accidental by-products or 
externalities. This latter category includes regulatory ES like water quality (which could be a beneficial ES 
or a harmful disservice, in the instance of water pollution), landscape appearance, net carbon sequestration, 
or wildlife habitat provision. In addition, certain ES provide intermediate products in the agricultural 
production process that have market value because they contribute directly to output of marketable farm 
products. This  category includes such ES  as  soil nitrogen  fixation, soil aeration, pollination by wild 
pollinators, and pest control by natural enemies.  Most of these essential services have parallel input 
markets,  and  they  have  monetary  value  to  farmers  that  can  be  calculated  from  the  marketed  input 
replacement cost. Multiple ES can represent different facets of the same underlying ecosystem, and hence 
treating  them  independently  can  lead  to potential  double  counting  of  benefits  or  the  overlooking  of 
synergy in ES provision. Because some ES are produced with agricultural goods or have a intermediate 
role in agricultural production, ES provision by agriculture does not neatly fit the standard wisdom that 
non-marketed ES will fail to be produced (Wossink and Swinton, 2007; Nicholson et al., 2009).  
In  summary:  agriculture  offers  special  opportunities  for  ES  provision  and  management  because  of 
economies of scale and scope. It follows that only those farm practices that generate net positive public ES 
should be rewarded by positive policy incentives. In addition, positive incentives should not be used, or 
reduced  accordingly,  when  farmers  employ  specific  land  use  practices  because  of  the  associated 
immediate effects on agricultural production (see Pannell, 2008, p. 228-229). This means that a reference 
line of ‘reasonable practice’ needs to be set up. The reference line would indicate where the Polluter Pays 
Principle ends and the Beneficiary Pays Principle starts. This reference line depends critically on the 
available farming practices and the given biophysical conditions in which these are used. 
3.  Theoretical Model 
To gain additional insights into the nature of the problem, we employ a generalised joint production model 
in combination with cost minimization. This theoretical model serves three purposes: to further formalise 
in economic terms the interaction of private production activities and ES, to formulate testable hypotheses, 
and to motivate an empirical approach. 
The  relationship  among  outputs  discussed in section  2  above  should  dictate  the  economic model to 
describe ES generation. It follows that a joint production framework is inadequate. This type of analysis 
assumes  the  two  outputs  (ES  and  agricultural production)  are  inseparable  and  share  all  inputs.  This 
provides too little flexibility to describe accurately the externalities from production. On the other hand, a 
multi-product specification with independent production functions provides too much flexibility to be 
useful in analysing the interaction of agricultural production activities and ES.   
The  positive/negative  externality  (ES)  interacts  with  agricultural  production  which  emphasises  the 
importance of allowing for weak separability (Archibald, 1988; Weaver, 1996; De Koeijer et al., 1999). 
The two outputs are produced simultaneously but since these are multiple outputs a separate production 
function is used for each output. This leads to a generalised joint production model. First applied to  
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externalities by Buchanan (1966) this model allows for joint inputs and the possibility of varying the 
proportion of agricultural output and ES. Omitting the time aspect, for a specific location with given 
biophysical and geographical characteristics D the model can be written in implicit form as: 
          0 ) ; , , ( ≤ D Z X Y F          (1a) 
0 ) ; , ( ≤ D X Z G         (1b) 
where Y is the vector of agricultural outputs (e.g., food provisioning), Z is the vector of final agro-
ecosystem  services  and  F(.)  and  G(.)  are  their  production  functions.  X  denotes  a  vector  of  inputs, 
contributing simultaneously to Y and Z. Combinations of Z and Y are site specific due to the physical 
environment as reflected in D, the vector of the a-biotic and biotic factors beyond a farmer’s control. In 
addition, the combination in which the Y and Z are generated is not fixed but depends on the farmer’s 
production decisions about X and Y. The equations enable the integration of two alternative perspectives, 
one where ecosystem services are associated with input use and the other were they take the form of 
outputs. The generalized joint production framework permits consideration of complementary, substitute 
and competitive relationships between marketed output and non-marketed ES. To assess these economic 
trade-offs, equations (1a) and (1b) are extended to a cost minimization framework. This also allows 
determination of the required level of incentives to be offered in order to stimulate the provision of ES by 
the individual farmer. Cost-minimization is less restrictive in terms of mathematical conditions than profit-
maximization.  For profit-maximization,  the  production  functions  of  the  two  outputs  must be  strictly 
concave  downwards;  else  a  profit  maximizing point  cannot  ever  be  reached.  Strict  concavity  is  not 
necessary for cost-minimization and this in turn allows for inferior inputs (see Silberberg and Suen, 2000, 
Chapter 8). These are important advantages as will be shown below. In addition, no adjustment is required 
to a free-market level of the price of the agricultural output.
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In order to establish the marginal cost of trading-off Y for Z, it will be necessary to impose a constraint on 
the level of ecosystem services, Zmin , which can be imagined to have been imposed by a benevolent social 
planner. Summarizing the aspects above, the economic solution is found through minimizing the direct 
cost function subject to the constraint on the ecosystem services, Zmin:   
              { } c pX C Min X − =     (2a)  
          Y D Z X F t s ≥ ) ; , ( . .      (2b) 
min ) , ( Z D X G ≥      (2c) 
where the fixed costs of the fixes factors of production are denoted as c and the price of the inputs is 
denoted as p. Y is a parametric value of marketable agricultural outputs, that is we derive the solution that 
minimizes total cost for arbitrary levels of the agricultural output without deciding what output level will 
be chosen by the farmer on the basis of profit maximization (Silberberg and Suen, 2001). Assuming the 
existence of an interior solution, the first order conditions for an optimal solution are given by: 
0 2 1 = + + − X X G F p λ λ   (3)   
   0 ) ; , ( = −Y D Z X F                (4) 
0 ) ; ( min = −Z D X G   (5)   
where λ1 is the Lagrange multiplier for the technology constraints (2b) and λ2 is the Lagrange multiplier for 
the constraint on ecosystems services (2c). In eqn. (3), the marginal effect of input use on agricultural 
output, FX ,  is composed as follows: 


















d       (6)    
where ∂F/∂X denotes the direct effect of input use and ∂F/∂Z *( ∂Z/∂X) denotes the indirect effect of input 
use  on  marketable  output  Y  by  way  of  the  ecosystem  services.  Input  bundle  X  contributes  to  both 
agricultural output and to ecosystem services, ∂F/∂X ≥0 and ∂G/∂X ≥0. Based on the discussion in section 
2 and Figure A1, we assume that Z becomes an inferior input for the production of the agricultural output 
once a specific level Z1 of ES has been reached. Thus ∂F/∂Z ≥0 for Z≤ Z1 and  ∂F/∂Z <0 for Z> Z1.  
Under the assumption that the functions F and G are sufficiently well behaved so that the second order 
conditions for a constrained minimum are satisfied, the solutions of the first order conditions yield the 
indirect cost function:  
c pX Z Y C + =
*
min
* ) , (       (7)  
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We are particularly interested in how this minimum cost function will respond to a change in the minimal 
acceptable level of ecosystems services. Using the envelope theorem and the first order conditions above, 



















       (8)  
Eqn. (8) shows how the generation of ES and agricultural production is connected through technical 
interdependencies and non-allocatable inputs. When the optimal amount of input 
* X  yields insufficient 
ES to satisfy Zmin, a rearrangement in input use, 
* X ∂ , is required to generate more ES, see Eqn. (5). This 
rearrangement in input use, 
* X ∂ , affects output Y, see Eqn. (6). We can now distinguish three cases:  
•  Case 1 (Complementary). Both the direct yield effect, ∂F/∂X, and the indirect yield effect, ∂F/∂Z *( 
∂Z/∂X), from the change in input use are positive (but decreasing). Thus a marginal increase in  Z  will 
enhance commodity output Y. In this situation the shadow price of the constraint on ES is nil, λ*2 = 0. 
This situation is represented by Zmin<Z2  in Figure A1. 
•  Case 2 (Substitutive). Either the direct yield effect, ∂F/∂X, , or the indirect yield effect, ∂F/∂Z *( 
∂Z/∂X), is non-positive but the net yield effect of the rearrangement of input X is positive, see Eqs. (6) 
and (8). The shadow price of the constraint on ES remains nil, λ*2 = 0. In figure A1, this would be Z2 ≤ 
Zmin ≤ Z1.  
•  Case 3 (Competitive). Further reallocation of inputs X is not possible without a net loss in yield. The 
direct yield effect of reallocating X is nil and there are yield losses caused by the required increase in Z 
needed to satisfy the constraint on the ecosystem services. In this case there is a shadow price of the 
constraint on ES, λ*2>0, made up of the expenditures for the additional inputs X and the net loss in 
yield. This situation is represented by Zmin>Z2  in Figure A1. 
From the theoretical discussion it follows that the prevalence of Cases 1-3 is an empirical matter that 
depends on: (a) the site-specific physical environment, (b) the type of agricultural production as reflected 
in the production function F, and on (c) the specific level of  Zmin  that is imposed.  
Practitioners, farmer and the policy maker alike, can be expected to be interested in the extent of Case 1 
and 2 where the supply of ES incurs no cost. This trajectory is subject to heterogeneity — it will vary by 
type of farms and by biophysical and geographical characteristics.  
4.    Empirical Application  
Agri-environmental policies that pursue non-marketed ES are a combination of incentive-based policies 
and command and control. Payments are offered for a number of approved farm practices (options) that 
can be easily monitored and that aim at an increase in specific final agro-ecological system services. The 
European Rural Development Regulation dictates that payment for these practices must be no more than 
the income forgone plus the additional costs incurred from undertaking environmental management. In 
practice,  scheme  payments  are  calculated  using  national  average  gross-margin  figures  with  average 
commodity/input price forecasts for the next 5 year. The use of national averages inevitably means that the 
payments may over or under compensate an agreement holder which obviously is inefficient.  
Our  empirical  analysis  considers  two  agri-environmental  programs:  the  Environmental  Stewardship 
Scheme (ESS) and the Hill Farm Allowance (HFA). The ESS is a voluntary, non-competitive, ‘whole-
farm’ scheme to encourage farmers across a wide area of farmland to deliver simple environmental 
management. The ESS was launched in 2005 and comprises Entry Level Stewardship (ELS) and Higher 
Level Stewardship. Organic farms are eligible for Organic Entry Level Stewardship and Organic Higher 
Level  Stewardship.  The  ESS  is  an  example  of  the  ‘wide-and-shallow’  approach  replacing the more 
targeted schemes that were in place since the mid eighties (Dobbs and Pretty, 2008). By September 2007, 
more than 47% of the total farmed area in England was enrolled in the entry level ESS. The area under the 
organic stewardship entry level is small, some 6% relative to the area under ELS (DEFRA, 2008). Thus 
most relevant in practise is the ELS in which participants can choose from a wide range of over 50 
management options. These options include for example hedgerow management, stone wall maintenance, 
low input grassland, buffer strips, and arable options. ELS payment is £30 per ha for all the land entered 
into the scheme. In return participants are required to deliver 30 points (8 points in Less Favoured Areas) 
worth of management options per ha of land in the scheme. There is no minimum holding size for entry 
into ESS and agreements are five year minimum which is an EU requirement.   
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The Hill Farm Allowance (HFA) is also voluntary and non-competitive and rewards hill farmers and land 
managers in Severely Disadvantaged Areas (SDAs) for the delivery of environmental and landscape 
benefits,  through  a  series  of  specially  designed  upland  options.  The  HFA  scheme  recognises  the 
difficulties  that  farmers  face  in  the  English  uplands  which  are  highly  valued  for  their  biodiversity, 
contribution to drinking water quality and flood mitigation and as a part of the natural cultural heritage. 
Participants must have a minimum of 10 hectares of eligible SDA forage land, and agree to keep it in 
agricultural production, continuously. They also need to keep eligible breeds of sheep and/or cows at a 
minimum of 0.15 livestock units per hectare across the LFA area of the holding. HFA is based on area 
payments (£/ha), which are made at different rates for different types of land and size of holding. For 
example in 2006, the payment for SDA Non-Moorland was £24.82 per ha for 0-350 ha and £12.41 for 
350-700 ha. The Hill Farm Allowance is currently in flux and will likely be replaced by an Uplands ESS . 
The form this should take is subject to debate.  
There are considerable differences between the ESS and the HFA that we expect will bear out in our 
empirical evaluation. Most of the 50+ management options included in the ELS part of the ESS are 
generic and the scope for variation from the average of £30 of income foregone and additional costs are 
therefore considerable. There is a low uptake of certain options and a significant proportion of agreement 
holders choose a limited number of options. The choice of options often does not match well with policy 
priority options for a given area (Chaplin, 2009). In addition, there is significant sectoral and associated 
geographical  variations  in  the  level  of  ELS  agreement  uptake.  In  contrast,  the  HFA  is  targeted 
geographically and prescriptive in terms of management.  
The empirical analysis employs farm level data based on the Farm Business Survey annually collected by 
DEFRA, UK. Our extracted sample consisted of all farms participating in the ESS scheme across England 
and Wales in the years 2005 to 2007. Data for 2008 and 2009 was not yet available at the time we 
completed this study. Our final sample consisted of 393 observations relating to 251 farms. Each farm is in 
the sample for at least 2 years with the majority of observations for 2007 (214). The sample farms are 
located all over England and Wales and about 5% is organic. The average farmer is 52 years of age, is 
male and has at least a college or national diploma certificate.  
Descriptive statistics can be obtained from the authors upon request. The average farm in the sample 
generates about 64% of its annual total output from agricultural activities, income from ecosystem services 
accounts for about 7% (ranging from about 0.4 to 30%). Cultivated area is 175 ha with 150 units of 
livestock. The variable EES covers payments received for participation in the Environmental Stewardship 
Scheme, our dataset does not distinguish between Entry Level Stewardship, Organic Entry level of Higher 
Level  Stewardship.
3    Following  Peerlings  and  Polman  (2004)  we  used  the  ESS payments  and HFA 
payments received as a proxy measure of the production of ecosystem services on the individual farm. 
Thus our outputs include: agricultural output (YAO), two types of ecosystem services (ZESS and ZHFA) 
and other non-agricultural output (YNAO). Inputs are land, labor, capital, lifestock, machinery, fertilizers, 
pesticides,  purchased  feed  and  veterinary  services.  Capital  covers  landlord  type  capital  exclusive  of 
agricultural land. All agricultural monetary variables, including the agri-environmental payments were 
deflated applying the appropriate PPI published by UK National Statistics. We used 2005 as the base year. 
Our  empirical  analysis  considers  both  agricultural  outputs  and  environmental  services  and  a 
transformation function is desirable for modeling the production process. The consideration of multiple 
outputs (i.e. agricultural output, output from environmental services as the Environmental Stewardship 
Scheme and the Hill Farm Allowance Scheme, non-agricultural and non-environmental service related 
output) precludes the estimation of a production function. In addition, we wish to avoid the disadvantages 
of normalizing by one input or output as would be required for a distance function. Imposing linear 
homogeneity on an input (output) distance function requires normalizing the inputs (outputs) by the input 
(output) appearing on the left hand side of the estimating equation. This raises issues about what variable 
to choose as the numeraire and about econometric endogeneity because the right hand side variables are 
expressed as ratios with respect to the left hand side variable (Coelli, 2000). A common approach in input 
distance function-based agricultural studies is to normalize by land that is to express the function in input-
per-acre terms (e.g., Paul and Nehring, 2005). However this procedure is ill suited for our application 
where biophysical variation of the land on the individual farm can be expected to be important. 
We thus rely on a transformation function model representing the output producible from a given input 
base and existing conditions, which also represents the feasible production set. This function in general  
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form can be written as 0 = F(Y,X,T), where Y is a vector of outputs,  X is a vector of inputs and T is  a 
vector of (external) shift variables. The function reflects the maximum amount of outputs producible from 
a given input vector and external conditions. By the implicit function theorem, if F(Y,X,T) is continuously 
differentiable and has non-zero first derivatives with respect to one of its arguments, it may be specified (in 
explicit form) with that argument on the left hand side of the equation. Accordingly, we estimate the 
transformation  function  Y1=  G(Y-1,X,T),  where,  Y1  is  the  agricultural  output  of  the  farms  (mainly 
livestock and crops) and Y-1 the vector of other outputs (including ecosystem services related outputs Z, 
and non-agricultural output YNAO), to represent the technological relationships for the farms in our data 
sample. Note that this specification does not reflect any endogeneity of output and input choices, but 
simply represents the technological maximum of Y1 that can be produced given the levels of the other 
arguments of the F(•) function. We approximate the transformation function by a flexible functional form 
(second order approximation to the general function), to accommodate various interactions among the 
arguments of the function including non-constant returns to scale and technical change biases.   
A flexible functional form can be expressed in terms of logarithms (translog), levels (quadratic), or square 
roots (generalized linear). We used the generalized linear functional form suggested by Diewert (1973) to 
avoid any problem with mathematical transformations of the original data (e.g. taking logs of variables 
which would lead to modelling problems with zero values): 
) , , Y , ( F Y NAO AO T X Z =  
, T Y b T Z b   T Z b
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      (9) 
where YAO is the total agricultural output (identical to Y1 above); ZESS denotes total output under the 
environmental stewardship scheme (ESS), ZHFA is total output under the hill farm allowance (HFA) and 
YNAO denotes total non-agricultural output as the components of Y-1. X denotes inputs with XLAND=land, 
XLAB=labor,  XCAP  =  capital,  XLU  =  livestock  units,  XMACH  =  machinery,  XFERT  =  fertiliser, XCHEM  = 
pesticides and XFODV = fodder and veterinarian services. Finally, a time trend is the only component of the 
T  vector.  The  estimated  model  recognizes  each  farm  i  in  time  period  t  is  as  a  separate  entity  and 
incorporates the following random effects specification: 
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The error term ui t in the random effects model (10) has a composite structure. The unobservable farm-
specific factors are represented by the random variable φi which is assumed to be distributed with mean 
zero and standard deviation σφ; ei t is assumed to be distributed with mean zero and standard deviation σe. 
In addition it is assumed that φi is independent of ei t (Baltagi, 1995). 
To represent and evaluate the technological or production structure, we are primarily interested in the  
first- and second-order elasticities of the transformation function.  The first-order elasticities (i.e. direct 
effects) of the transformation function in terms of agricultural output YAO represent the (proportional) 
shape of the production possibility frontier (given inputs) for outputs YNAO, ZESS and ZHFA and the shape 
of the production function (given other inputs and YNAO, ZESS and ZHFA) for input Xk – or output trade-
offs and input contributions to agricultural output respectively. That is, the estimated output elasticity with  
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respect  to  the  “other”  outputs:  εAO,ESS=∂lnYAO/∂lnYESS=    ∂YAO/∂YESS*(YESS/YAO);  εAO,HFA= 
∂lnYAO/∂lnYHFA=  YAO/∂YHFA*(YHFA/YAO),  and  εAO,NAO=  ∂lnYAO/∂lnYNAO= 
∂YAO/∂YNAO*(YNAO/YAO)  are  expected  to  be  negative  as  they  reflect  the  slope  of  the  production 
possibility frontier, with its magnitude capturing the (proportional) marginal trade-off..  The estimated 
output elasticity with respect to input k, εAO,k=∂lnYAO/∂lnXk= ∂YAO/∂Xk*(Xk/YAO), are expected to be 
positive, with its magnitude representing the (proportional) marginal productivity of Xk. Second-order 
own-elasticities may also be computed to confirm that the curvature of these functions satisfies regularity 
conditions; the marginal productivity would be expected to be increasing at a decreasing rate, and the 
output trade-off decreasing at an increasing rate, so second derivatives with respect to YNAO, ZESS, ZHFA 
and Xk would be negative (concavity with respect to both outputs and inputs). 
Returns to scale may be computed as a combination of the YAO elasticities with respect to YNAO, ZESS, 
ZHFA and the inputs. For the situation of a production function (single output), returns to scale is defined 
as the sum of the input elasticities to reflect in a sense the distance between isoquants. Similarly for a 
transformation function such a measure must control for the other outputs.  Formally, returns to scale are 
defined for the transformation function similarly to the treatment for the distance function in Caves et al. 
(1982) – for our purposes as εAO,X=∑k εAO,k /(1 - εAO,ESS - εAO,HFA - εAO,NAO). Technical change is 
measured by shifts in the overall production frontier over time. As our only technical change variable is 
the trend term T, productivity/technical change is estimated as the output elasticity with respect to T, 
εAO,T=∂lnYAO/∂T=  ∂YAO/∂T*(1/YAO).    This represents how much more agricultural output may be 
produced on an annual basis in proportional terms, given the levels of the inputs and other outputs. Returns 
to scale and technical change measures may be computed for each observation and presented as an 
average over a subset of observations (such as for the full sample, a farm, a time period or a particular 
class of spatially clustered farms), or may be computed for the average values of the data for a subset of 
observations. The latter approach is known as the delta method; it evaluates the elasticities at one point that 
represents the average value of the elasticity for a particular set of observations, allowing standard errors to 
be computed for inference even though the elasticity computation involves a combination of econometric 
estimates and data.
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Based on our theoretical model outlined above the following measures are particularly relevant for our 
analysis: The direct yield or output effect dF/dx as the marginal product or marginal physical product is 
the extra output produced by one more unit of an input. Assuming that no other input to production 
changes, the marginal product of a given input k, MPk, is captured by the estimated first derivative with 
respect to input k: 
              MPk = ∂YAO/∂Xk,                 (11) 
The total direct yield or output effect, MPX , as the total marginal product or total marginal physical 
product is the extra output produced by one more unit of all inputs; 
MPX = ∂YAO/∂X = ∑k (∂YAO/∂Xk).             (12) 
The estimated marginal effects on YAO with respect to the “other” outputs are: 
MEAO,ESS = ∂YAO/∂ZESS                 (13) 
MEAO,HFA = ∂YAO/∂ZHFA                (14)     
MEAO,NAO = ∂YAO/∂YNAO ,               (15) 
whereas the total direct yield or output effect dF/dY-1 is the extra output produced by one more unit of all 
“other” outputs: 
TMEY-1 = ∂YAO/∂Y-1 =  ∂YAO/∂ZESS + ∂YAO/∂ZHFA + ∂YAO/∂YNAO       (16) 
Further we are interested in the indirect yield or output effect with respect to the “other” outputs given 
marginal changes in input k: 
IMEAO,ESS,k = MEAO,ESS (∂ZESS/∂Xk) = (∂YAO/∂ZESS)(∂ZESS/∂Xk)      (17) 
   IMEAO,HFA,k = MEAO,HFA (∂ZHFA/∂Xk) = (∂YAO/∂ZHFA)(∂ZHFA/∂Xk)      (18) 
IMEAO,NAO,k = MEAO,NAO (∂YNAO/∂Xk) = (∂YAO/∂YNAO)(∂YNAO/∂Xk)    (19) 
with the total indirect yield or output effect per “other” output (dF/dY-1)(dY-1/dX) caused by the use of 
one more unit of all inputs as: 
ΣIMEAO,Y-1,X = ∑k (∂YAO/∂Y-1)(∂Y-1/∂Xk)          (20) 
Given the signs and values of the estimated marginal measures defined by (11) to (20), the following three 
cases can be distinguished in line with our theoretical outline above: Case I, where the total direct effect, 
given by (12), is positive and the total indirect effect, given by (20) is also positive; Case II, where either  
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the  total  direct  effect  or  the  total  indirect  effect  is  negative  but  the  total  net  effect  is  positive  (i.e. 
∑k(∂YAO/∂Xk) + ∑k(∂YAO/∂Y-1)(∂Y-1/∂Xk) > 0); Case III, where both effects are negative and hence the 
total net effect is negative (i.e. ∑k(∂YAO/∂Xk) + ∑k(∂YAO/∂Y-1)(∂Y-1/∂Xk) < 0).  
5.    Results and Discussion 
The  estimated  generalized linear  transformation  function in a random  effects specification  showed a 
satisfactory overall model performance (estimates and standard quality measures can be obtained from the 
authors upon request). Additional diagnostic tests show that the random effects estimation is superior to 
the ordinary cross-sectional estimation (see LM test value). More than 50% of the estimated parameters 
are significant at least at the 10% level. Table A1 reports the estimated first order elasticities at the sample 
means. As required by theory these estimates are positive for the non-primary outputs and negative for all 
inputs. Further, the own second order elasticities are all negative confirming the curvature correctness of 
the transformation function estimated. The calculated direct and indirect effects are summarized in Table 
A2. Note that these values represent the simple statistical means based on the effects calculated for each 
individual observation in the sample. Next, we used the estimation results to assess which of the three 
product relationships (complementary, substitutive or competitive) prevails in our dataset based on the 
procedure outlined in section 4.3 above. We assessed this relationship for: agricultural output, two types of 
ecosystem services and other, non-agricultural output. The assessment of these product relationships are 
based on the individual direct and indirect effects at each observation values for outputs and inputs.  The 
results of this assessment are reported in Table A3 with an interpretation of the various cases in Table A4. 
Table A3 shows that a majority of 314 (80%) of the 393 farms in our sample produce agricultural output 
and ecosystem services (either ESS or HFA oriented) in a complementary relationship. A minority of the 
farms produced these outputs in a competitive relationship (79 observations). We did not find substitutive 
relationship between the production of ecosystem services and agricultural production. Hence, for most of 
the  farms  (80%)  the  production  of  agricultural  output  and  the  provision  of  ecosystem  services  is 
complementary and so both could be increased further (at the margin) by changing the input allocation. 
These farms operate on the upward sloping part of the production possibility frontier up to Z2 in Figure 
A1.  
From the estimation results it follows that current ESS and HFA programs are formulated in such a way 
that they lead to opportunity costs for only 20% of the farms participating in one of these schemes. This 
implies the requirements in these schemes could be further increased at no initial cost for 80% of the 
farms. It would be important to identify and analyse the latter group of farms in terms of location and main 
activities. The results in Table A3 further reveal that the production of multiple ecosystem services (ZHFA 
and  ZESS)  on  the  same  farms  shows  either  a  substitutive  relationship  (121  and  202  observations, 
respectively) or a competitive relationship (272 and 191 observations, respectively). Thus there is no 
evidence of complementary relationship for the production of different ecosystem services (ZHFA and 
ZESS).  
The effect of a change in the composition of the generation of different ecosystem services on the same 
farm is complex.. A change in favour of HFA output would have negative effects for 69% of the farmers. 
A  change  in  favour  of  ESS  outputs  has  less  clear  cut  economic  effects:  for  51  %  this  would  be 
advantageous and for 49 % negative. This result is interesting in particular in the context of the current 
reformulation of the HFA scheme. Likely this will take the form of an Upland Higher Level ESS. There is 
a real concern among farmers and researchers how this change in regulation will play out (Hodge and 
Reader 2010). The empirical results in Table A3 justify this concern. 
Further the results show that agricultural and non-agricultural output are substitutive for the majority of 
farms in the sample (314) and competitive for only a minority of farms (79 observations). We also found 
that the nature of the production relationship between ecosystem services and non agricultural output 
depends on the type of ecosystem service provided: substitutive (202 observations) or competitive (191 
observations) for ESS, and complementary (121 observation) or competitive (272 observations) for HFA. 
Thus for 69 % of the farmers more HFA output combines well with non-agricultural activities but the 
opposite applies to the remaining 31 %. The interaction between ESS activities and non-farm activities 
shows a very different pattern ― for 51% of the farms this relationship is substitutive.  
6.   Conclusions 
As ecosystem managers, farmers’ decisions drive the mix of ecosystem services and agricultural goods 
that is produced. Agri-environmental schemes that pursue ecosystem service provision are a combination  
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of incentive-based policies and command and control. Payments are offered for a number of approved 
farm practices (options) that can be easily monitored. For agri-environmental schemes to be effective and 
cost-efficient, decision makers need to know how these options interact with  agricultural production 
decisions which means taking into account the heterogeneity in farms and in farming conditions. Spatial 
heterogeneity,  the  “where”  issue,  matters  both  economically  and  ecologically.  Economically,  spatial 
heterogeneity matters because the economic landscape varies as much as the biophysical landscape. Both 
these spatial factors affect the marginal costs of producing ecosystem services and thus where changing 
farming practices is most effective and least costly (selective control).  
We provide a new approach for assessing the cost of marginal ecosystem service provision and the 
effectiveness of green payment schemes based on a theoretical and empirical analysis of the bio-economic 
production interactions at the farm level. The generalized joint production framework allows for the 
consideration  of  complementary,  substitutive  and  competitive  relationships  between  agricultural 
production  and  non-marketed  ecosystem  services  generation  and  avoids  double  counting.  From  this 
theoretical model we distinguish three theoretical cases depending on the imposed minimum acceptable 
level of the ecosystem services.  
Next,  we  employ  farm  level  panel  data  for  the  UK  to  empirically  investigate  these  cases.  More 
specifically, to represent and evaluate the technological or production structure, we estimate first- and 
second-order elasticities derived from a flexible transformation function.  
Results  showed  that  the  majority  of  farms  produce  agricultural  output  and  ecosystem  services  in  a 
complementary relationship but that the nature of the production relationship depends distinctly on the 
type of ecosystem services provided; a change in the composition of the ecosystem services output would 
have  very  different  implications  for  individual  farms.  There  was  no  evidence  of  a  complementary 
relationship for the production of different ecosystem services. Generation of different ecosystem services 
on the same farm showed either a substitutive or competitive relationship.  
In further work we aim to investigate significant characteristics of the farms being part of the classes I-III 
as estimated in our paper. A multivariate (ordered) probit modeling approach could be used to relate the 
three classes to spatial, socioeconomic, financial, and other individual farm/farmer characteristics. More 
sophisticated models (mixed-effects logistic) could also be explored. Finally, other modelling alternatives 
to the two-part model could be used, e.g. Generalized Methods of Moments.  
Endnotes 
1. The single-farm payments that replace commodity price support are tied to the condition of maintaining land in good agricultural condition 
based on national standards of ‘Good farming practice’.  This condition is commonly known as ‘cross- compliance’. 
2. Where agricultural policy supports prices foregone revenue will be larger than under free market conditions. Hence, in order to analyze 
payment for ecosystem services as an alternative to agricultural price support policies, the opportunity cost should be based on the free market.  
3. Hodge and Reader (2010) present a detailed analysis of the extent and types of practices that have been adopted using DEFRA’s GENESIS 
GIS system. This material cannot be linked to DEFRA’s annual Farm Business Survey used in our study. Neither the GENESIS data nor our 
data set contains information on the actual environmental impacts. 
4.  The  “delta  method”  computes  standard  errors  using  a  generalization  of  the  Central  Limit  Theorem,  derived  using  Taylor  series 
approximations, which is useful when one is interested in some function of a random variable rather than the random variable itself (Gallant and 
Holly, 1980). For our application, this method uses the parameter estimates from our model and the corresponding variance covariance matrix to 
evaluate the elasticities at average values of the arguments of the function. 
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Table A2 -  Descriptive Statistics for Direct and Indirect Effects 
   Effect evaluated   Mean  Std. Dev.
1  Min  Max 
dYAO/dX  173.978  259.197  -440.066  1591.110 
dYAO/dZESS  .372  2.887  -8.233  12.288 
dYAO/dZHFA  -2.529  6.310  -39.071  23.947 
(dYAO/dZESS)(dZESS/dX)  0.065  0.032  0.006  0.192 
(dYAO/dZHFA)(dZHFA/dX)  0.071  0.058  0.007  0.438 
(dYAO/dZESS)(dZESS/dZHFA) 
= (dYAO/dZHFA)(dZHFA/dZESS)  -6.61e-04  5.61e-04  -0.004  -7.01e-05 
(dYAO/dYNAO)(dYNAO/dZHFA)  9.03e-05  7.74E-05  1.21e-05  5.83e-04 
(dYAO/dYNAO)(dYNAO/dZESS)  -5.03e-05  3.09E-05  -2.24e-04  5.24e-06 
Table A1 – Estimated 1st Order Elasticities 
 
Output/Input  est
1  se 
ESS  -.011***        .005      
HFA  -.232***        .043     
NAO  -.151**         .079     
LAND  .068***        .007      
LAB  .281***        .071      
CAP  .024***        .003      
LU  .638***        .092      
MACH  .152***        .064      
FERT  .036**         .016     
CHEM  .147***        .028      
FODVET  .175***        .057      
T  .134***        .043      
RTS  1.039***        .053     
(Delta Method at Sample Means)
 
1 : *,**,*** : significance at 10%- , 5%- , or 1%-level. 
The own 2
nd order elasticities are all negative, the estimates 
can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
 
 
Table A3 - Estimated Cases and number of observations per case for various Product-Product Relationships
a 
  Relationship considered between the following two variables: 









non agric. output 
ESS 
non agric. output 
agric. output 
non agric. output 
Direct effect  dYAO/dX  dYAO/dX  dYAO/dZHFA  dYAO/dZESS  dYAO/dZHFA  dYAO/dZESS  dYAO/dX 














Case I  314  314  0  0  121  0  0 
Case II  0  0  121  202  0  202  314 
Case III  79  79  272  191  272  191  79 
Total Obs.  393  393  393  393  393  393  393 
a For variable definition see Table 1. Case I – direct effect and indirect effect are positive (complementary). Case II - direct effect or indirect effect is positive, net effect is positive (substitutive). 
 Case III - direct effect <= 0 and indirect effect is negative (competitive). 
 
      Table A4 - Options for Efficient Production Schedule Rearrangements 
  Relationship considered between: 









non agric. output 
ESS 
non agric. output 
agric. output 
non agric. output 
Case I  produce more agric. 
and more ESS output 
produce more agri  and 
more hfa 
produce more HFA 
and more ESS 
produce more ESS and 
more HFA 
produce more HFA and more 
non agric. 
produce more ESS and more 
non agric. 
produce more agri and more 
non agri 
Case II  produce more agric. or 
more ESS 
(depending on effects) 
produce more agric. 
output  or more HFA 
(depending on effects) 
produce more HFA or 
more ESS 
(depending on effects) 
produce more ESS or 
more HFA 
(depending on effects) 
produce more HFA or more 
non agric. 
(depending on effects) 
produce more ESS or more 
non agric. 
(depending on effects) 
produce more agri or more 
non agri 
(depending on effects) 
Case III  produce more ESS  produce more HFA  produce more ESS  produce more HFA  produce more non agric.  produce more non agric.  produce more non agric. 
 